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FTER SURVIVING MANY COUPS D’ÉTAT, political assassina-
tion attempts, political upheavals, and political transi-
tions, one of Africa’s political dinosaurs finally bowed out
on February 5, 2005. According to reports, Gnassingbe
Eyadema, the President of Togo, died of a heart attack while being
flown abroad for medical treatment. His remains were finally laid to
rest on March 13, 2005. 
What is intriguing about his death is not so much the fact
that the last of the dominant francophone dictators, including
Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Mobutu Sese
Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), is gone
after a record 38 years in office, but the circumstances surround-
ing how the deceased’s son came to assume the reins of President.
This paper analyzes the circumstances of the succession, the
reaction of African leaders to the change of government, and the
likely precedent this may set for the development of a democrat-
ic culture in Africa. 
The installation of Faure Essozima Gnassingbe to succeed
his father and the subsequent amendment of the Togolese
Constitution to permit his installation failed to follow the
Constitution’s dictates pertaining to succession. For Togo to
move toward a constitutional democracy and an internationally
recognized legitimate government, the Togolese government
must make democratic reforms to ensure genuine respect for
human rights in conformity with the spirit of the current
Constitution. Although the African Union (AU) and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) inter-
vened to force Gnassingbe to step down temporarily, additional
steps must be taken to put Togo on a track of constitutional
governance.
GNASSINGBE SUCCEEDS HIS FATHER
A FEW DAYS BEFORE EYADEMA’S DEATH, the President of the National
Assembly, Fambare Natchaba Ouattara, traveled to Europe on offi-
cial assignment as head of a parliamentary delegation. He was in
Europe when Eyadema passed away. Prime Minister Kofi Samma
announced Eyadema’s death that same day on state radio and televi-
sion. About two hours later, the Chief of Staff of the Togolese Armed
Forces, General Zachari Nandja, appeared on state television flanked
by the country’s top army personnel to announce: “The armed forces
of Togo find itself [sic] faced with the evidence of a total vacuum of
power in Togo. This is because the Speaker of the National Assembly
is absent. Therefore, in order not to create a power vacuum, the
armed forces of Togo have decided to declare Faure Gnassingbe the
head of state.” He concluded, “The Togolese armed forces swear alle-
giance to Faure Gnassingbe as President of the Republic of Togo.”
At the same time, General Nandja announced the closure of the
country’s borders. As a result of this measure, the President of the
National Assembly, who was returning home from his trip, was not
allowed to re-enter the country. For all intents and purposes, the
military thus created the “power vacuum.” 
AU AND ECOWAS REACTIONS
FOLLOWING THESE DEVELOPMENTS, messages of condolence began to
pour in from world leaders, as well as condemnatory reactions to the
installation of Faure Gnassingbe as the new leader of Togo.
Noteworthy among the reactions was the AU and ECOWAS’s swift
and vehement opposition to, and condemnation of, the takeover of
power.
Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo, the current chair-
man of the AU, said the appointment was unconstitutional and
refused to accept the transition of power. AU Commission
Chairperson Alpha Omar Konare labelled the succession a
military coup d’état. He called for the constitutional order to be
re-established and for the President of the National Assembly
to assume power properly. Both the Executive Secretary of
ECOWAS, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and ECOWAS Chair,
President Mamadou Tandja of Niger, were unequivocal in
expressing ECOWAS’s opposition to the coup plot. 
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
THE STRONG AND DECISIVE REACTION of other African leaders was
indeed unprecedented and took the Togolese authorities by surprise.
In an effort to manage the general tone of opposition to the military
takeover, the Togolese Parliament stepped in. It convened an extraor-
dinary session of Parliament on February 6 to amend the
Constitution, which the Army had suspended the day before to
allow the President of the National Assembly to stand as President
for the next five years. The Parliament, however, subsequently
replaced the legitimate Speaker of the National Assembly, Natchaba,
with Gnassingbe. 
Upon ECOWAS’s insistence that the process was still flawed
and in violation of the Constitution and ECOWAS principles,
Gnassingbe made some concessions. Although he refused to step
down, he announced that he would not serve the full five years
of his term. Rather, he called for presidential elections within two
months, as stipulated by the original version of the Constitution.
This decision did not sway ECOWAS. Following his refusal to
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step down, ECOWAS, at its extraordinary session in Niamey,
Niger, on February 19, imposed sanctions on the illegitimate
regime. 
In the face of this opposition, the Togolese authorities
resorted to constitutional means to maintain the appearance that
it was committed to democratic principles. The Parliament met
to reverse its earlier decision made on February 6. The reversal of
its prior constitutional amendment left unclear who was running
the country because the National Assembly stopped short of
asking Gnassingbe to step down. It was not until February 25
that Gnassingbe finally announced that he was stepping aside but
would be running as the presidential candidate of the
Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (Rally of the Togolese People, or
RPT). The next day, Abbas Bonfo, the Deputy Speaker of the
National Assembly, was sworn in as interim president. The
Parliament set the presidential election for April 24.
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
BY ALL ACCOUNTS, THE EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 5 amounted to a clas-
sic military take-over in contravention of the Togolese Constitution.
Article 65 of the Togolese Constitution stipulates that, in the case of
a vacuum in the presidency created through death, resignation, or
incapacity, the functions of the President shall pass provisionally to
the President of the National Assembly or Speaker of Parliament.
The Constitutional Court establishes and officially recognizes the
validity of the vacancy. The provisional government then has 60 days
within which to organize elections and elect a new president, who
will serve a full term of five years. 
ARMY SUSPENDED THE CONSTITUTION
In accordance with Article 65, Natchaba should have been
sworn in as the interim head of state to run the 60-day transition
period upon Eyadema's death. The Army’s suspension of the
Constitution and installation of Faure Gnassingbe as the new
head of state amounted to a military coup d’état. Article 147 of
the Constitution explicitly states that the Togolese Armed Forces
are “a national, republican and apolitical army,” which is “totally
subject to the constitutional political authority that has been
properly established.” Article 148 further says that all attempts to
overthrow a constitutional regime by personnel of the Armed
Forces or the public security services are crimes against the nation
and punishable by law.
Article 54 of the Constitution notes that in the case of a
vacuum created in the Presidency of the National Assembly
through death, resignation, or for “any other reason,” the
National Assembly shall elect a new person to fill the position.
Although President of the National Assembly Natchaba was lead-
ing an official delegation to the European Union, he was still act-
ing as the National Assembly President, even while outside the
country, and did not die nor resign. Apart from death or resig-
nation, Natchaba’s removal and replacement could be justified
under the “any other reason” language only if done by the
National Assembly and for good cause. The Army did not
provide a reason for removing Natchaba from office. More
importantly, it was not the Army’s function to do so, but that of
Parliament. The Army did not have the power to appoint a new
person to replace the National Assembly President; only the
Parliament had this authority.
Furthermore, the Parliament did not act in accordance with
the Togolese Constitution when it ignored the rules of succession
and amended the Constitution to permit Gnassingbe’s appoint-
ment as President. Article 150 of the Togolese Constitution
stipulates that in the event of a coup d’état or any use of force to
overthrow the constitutionally elected government, all members
of the government or National Assembly have the right and duty
to re-establish constitutional legitimacy by any means. It further
states that, in such circumstances, all Togolese have “the most
sacred of rights and the most imperative of duties” to disobey and
organize to abort the establishment of an illegitimate authority.
The National Assembly, however, did not restore constitutional
legitimacy on February 6. Rather, it sought to install Faure
Gnassingbe as leader of the nation, no matter what consequences
might ensue. 
The Parliament’s actions raise several issues. According to
the Constitution, only the National Assembly President can con-
vene an extraordinary session, following a request made by the
President of the Republic or by the absolute majority of deputies.
Either Natchaba, as the National Assembly President, should
have been present to convene the extraordinary session or the
Parliament should have appointed a new Speaker in his stead. It
is unclear whether the Parliament took these steps. 
FOREGOING MANDATED ELECTIONS
Another issue is the Parliament’s amendment to the
Constitution that removed the legal requirement to hold elec-
tions in Togo within 60 days of the death of a President. The new
article to the Constitution stated that the President of the
National Assembly succeeds the President of the Republic and
may remain in office until the end of the previous President’s
mandate. According to the Togolese Constitution, at least four
conditions must be met before the Constitution can be amend-
ed. First, the authority to amend the Constitution is shared
concurrently between the President of the Republic on the advice
of the Prime Minister and at least one-fifth of the members of the
legislature. Second, 80 percent of the National Assembly must
vote for the amendment in order for it to be adopted. Third, in
the event that this majority is not attained, the bill shall be sub-
jected to a national referendum. Finally, the Constitution is
categorical in stating that no procedure for amendment shall be
initiated or pursued during an interim period or vacancy, or
when it relates to the territorial integrity of the nation.
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The Assembly likely satisfied the first two conditions
necessary to amend the Constitution, which negated the need for
a referendum. But it is difficult to see how the last condition
could have been met or overcome. When the amendment was
made, there was no President of the Republic or of the National
Assembly. Certainly, the National Assembly passed the amend-
ment when a vacancy existed and during an interim period. The
amendment therefore did not meet the test of constitutional
validity.
In sum, the Assembly’s actions were unconstitutional. It
failed to do at least three things required by the Constitution:
(1) to condemn the suspension of the Constitution and the
installation of Gnassingbe as the new head of state; (2) to call on
the Constitutional Court to rule on the legality of the takeover
and demand the arrest and prosecution of Gnassingbe and the
army brass; and (3) to call for the return of the Speaker of the
National Assembly to assume his legitimate role as interim
President. To add to its catalogue of constitutional failures, the
Parliament convened an emergency session of Parliament in con-
travention of constitutional procedures and amended the
Constitution contrary to its letter and spirit.
Internal opposition to this chain of events was expressed on
the radio, in the newspapers, and on the streets. The police and
military met these legitimate and constitutionally protected
political expressions with force, resulting in the death of one pro-
tester on February 12. Three more died in another encounter
with the police. The government shut down seven private radio
stations and a television station and banned all political rallies.
Interestingly, Gnassingbe, who in his “acceptance speech” had
vowed to respect the democratic rights of the Togolese people,
upheld the police’s actions and condemned the march organizers.
Indeed, the actions of the Togolese authorities violated the
Togolese Constitution, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, and international law, which the Togolese
Constitution itself upholds. 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECOWAS MOVE
INITIALLY ESTABLISHED AS AN ECONOMIC UNION, the objectives of
ECOWAS, as defined in the ECOWAS Treaty, did not include pro-
tection or promotion of human rights and democracy. The princi-
ples guiding ECOWAS in the realization of its objectives, however,
include, under Article 4(g), “the recognition of promotion and pro-
tection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provi-
sions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.”
Guided by this principle, ECOWAS has issued declarations and
protocols, which recognize the inextricable link between develop-
ment and peace, security, human rights, the rule of law, and
democratic governance. 
Thus, at the 14th Session of the Authority of Heads of
State and Government held in Abuja, Nigeria, in July 1991,
ECOWAS created the Declaration of Political Principles of
ECOWAS (Declaration). The Declaration reaffirms the need to
promote rights, liberties, and political pluralism. In particular,
the Declaration states: “We believe in the liberty of the individ-
ual and in his inalienable right to participate by means of free
and democratic processes in the framing of the society in which
he lives. We will therefore strive to encourage and promote in
each our countries, political pluralism and those representative
institutions and guarantees for personal safety and freedom
under the law that are our common heritage.”
The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism For Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
(Protocol), adopted in 1998, further strengthened the 1991
Declaration. Article 25(e) of the Protocol stipulates that one of
the conditions for its application shall include a situation that
involves “an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democrati-
cally elected government.” A Supplementary Protocol was adopt-
ed three years later. It expresses “[z]ero tolerance for power ob-
tained or maintained by unconstitutional means” and considers
the armed forces an “apolitical” body that “must be under the
command of a legally constituted political authority.” 
In accordance with these principles, ECOWAS took the
proper steps of not recognizing the new Togolese regime and
imposing sanctions when Gnassingbe’s concessions fell short of
stepping down. Gnassingbe’s decision to allow for elections with-
in the 60-day period did not comply with the Constitution, as
amended on February 6. It was up to the National Assembly to
have made that decision through another constitutional amend-
ment. Interestingly, the National Assembly later legitimized and
endorsed Gnassingbe’s decision, demonstrating the extent of
Gnassingbe’s control in Togo. 
ECOWAS MOVE: A CRITIQUE
THE AU AND PARTICULARLY ECOWAS ACTED PROPERLY in flexing
their muscles to ensure that their commitment to zero tolerance for
unconstitutional change of government was genuine. In so doing,
ECOWAS set an important precedent for and a strong message on
the need to groom and maintain democratic governance in the sub-
region. 
ECOWAS, however, has not finished its job. Its mission is
twofold: first, to reverse the military coup and unseat
Gnassingbe, and second, to ensure that the proper processes are
put in place for free and fair elections. Although the first mission
was successfully accomplished, the second was not. ECOWAS
should have ensured that the Parliament recognized the National
Assembly President, Natchaba, and not the Deputy President,
Bonfo, as the interim president, as required by Article 54 of the
Constitution. Parliament’s replacement of Natchaba with Bonfo
was unconstitutional. 
ECOWAS should also demand that the Parliament put in
place certain short-term reform measures to foster the creation of
a long-term sustainable democratic culture in Togo. The short-
term measures should include: (1) the review of laws and policies
“The government shut down
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that were used in previous elections to frustrate opposition efforts
to mount effective campaigns (of particular importance are the
draconian press laws, which allow the government to jail jour-
nalists for “defaming or insulting” the President, the courts, or
other state institutions); (2) the assurance of fair and equal access
of the opposition to the state media; (3) determined and genuine
efforts to expunge the electoral list of “ghost names,” which are
estimated to constitute as much as 25 percent of registered vot-
ers; (4) better representation of the opposition in the national
electoral bodies; and (5) revision of the electoral codes, which
remain outdated and weighted in favor of the incumbent.
ECOWAS’s mandate is to ensure that “every accession to
power must be made through free, fair and transparent
elections.” This responsibility does not lie in the mere monitor-
ing of the election process. It involves facilitating an even politi-
cal playing field. Unless these measures are put in place, the mere
presence of an ECOWAS election monitoring force will not
make much difference. 
The long-term measures necessary for democratic reform
in Togo include an overhaul of the Constitution to conform to
its 1992 format, particularly restoring the two-term office for a
President (instead of the indefinite term) and abolishing the one-
year residency rule which limits exiled politicians from standing
for office. Another measure is creating a favorable climate to
allow for the effective functioning of Togolese civil society,
which remains paralyzed. Because the RPT has been in power for
38 years and maintains a stranglehold over the state media, the
judiciary, the national assembly, and other state institutions,
democratic structures must be established to ensure effective
checks and balances in the political structure. The opposition
remains battered, fractured, disorganized, and in need of ample
time and space to reorganize. These are issues that cannot be
resolved within 60 days. This does not justify, however, opposi-
tion demands for an extension of the 60-day period. Doing so
would itself violate the Constitution. These long-term measures
remain the political duty of the Togolese people but can be
addressed more adequately if the short-term measures are
established first.
CONCLUSION
PERHAPS MOTIVATED BY THE CIVIL CONFLICTS that have affected
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast, ECOWAS realized that it
could no longer passively observe the deterioration of the political
situation in Togo. This preventive approach is commendable and sets
a very positive precedent. The question is how long ECOWAS can
sustain this policy of prevention. The case of Togo is a fairly “easy”
assignment, considering that it is a small country and of little
strategic significance to any of the major powers. Above all, it was
headed by a relative newcomer to politics who was riding on the
dictatorial legacy of his father. If ECOWAS would have had to con-
front a regional superpower, such as Nigeria, or an entrenched
leader, such as Eyadema himself, perhaps the response and outcome
would have been different. It is worth a reminder that Nigeria
continues to harbor former Liberian leader Charles Taylor,
against whom the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone
has issued an arrest warrant in connection with the atrocities com-
mitted in the Sierra Leonean civil war. But ECOWAS has not been
able to act against Nigeria. Time will tell how ECOWAS’s precedent
will fare. HRB
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